I have been delinquent in contributing to this blog lately, and so it’s perhaps especially shameless for me to throw myself back in for the purposes of self-promotion. But I’m shameless, so I’m going to do it. After all, one reason I’ve been delinquent is that I’ve actually been getting work done, and there’s more than a slight possibility that a few readers will find the items promoted here of some interest.
First, my article “Aristotle and the Scope of Justice” has been published in the Journal of Ancient Philosophy. JAP is open access, so a pdf of the article is freely available for download. The woefully abbreviated abstract that accompanies the paper does not adequately advertise its contents. Here is a slightly more informative snippet from the introduction:
My goal in this paper is to show that while Aristotle holds that justice depends on community, his view does not have the unsavory implications often attributed to it. To do this, I consider two alternative attempts to address this issue, one by extending the bounds of community to encompass all human beings, and another by appealing to virtues other than justice to transcend the limitations of community. Against the first, I argue that Aristotle does not maintain that we have actual obligations of justice to every human being. Against the second, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, none of our actual relations to other human beings falls outside the scope of justice, and although we have obligations of justice only to those with whom we are already in community, we have what I will call eudaimonic reasons to seek justice and avoid injustice in all of our relations with others. I conclude by suggesting that Aristotle’s approach fares better in comparison to fundamentally impartial or rights-based theories of justice than we might initially suppose.
Readers of this blog may find the view I defend unsurprising; what is surprising is that it has not been more fully developed by others.
The second item I am here to promote is my review of Susan Sauvé Meyer’s new commentary on Plato’s Laws 1 & 2. Happily, this is only partially self-promotion, since the review is a positive one that I hope serves to recommend not only the commentary but the Laws itself. The dialogue has perhaps the worst reputation of all of Plato’s works. If you find yourself among the crowd that suspects it is more a product of senility than of genius, Meyer’s commentary may help to convince you otherwise.
So there you have it. Two interesting things to read and ample evidence that I would fail miserably at a career in advertising.