The Epistemology of Mass Death

Does the item below reflect a good faith attempt to avoid civilian casualties, or does it express a cynical, murderous attempt to demand the impossible, then set up a pretext for the mass killing of large swatches of north Gaza (in principle all of it)–and as much of south Gaza as Israel chooses to hit, while demanding that the northern population flee there?

To belabor the obvious: both hypotheses are in play, as are all of the ones intermediate between them. Strictly speaking, the evidence neither rules in nor rules out either hypothesis. But no impartial observer could say that American political discourse is structured by the preceding fact. The obvious, ubiquitous epistemic imperative appears to be: rule out the latter, “pretext-for-mass-killing” hypothesis a priori, on pain of being labeled a terrorist-sympathizer, an anti-Semite, or a traitor. Why? Are we not permitted even ex hypothesi to consider the ascription of malign motives to Israel? In that case, I guess I’m not interested in getting anyone’s permission before I do.

We’ve reached the point in this country where we’re expected to forswear the right to frame hypotheses about Israel’s behavior, even when the evidence is perfectly compatible with a given one, however adverse to Israel’s self-image or projected one. Mass self-induced blindness may be an epistemology conducive to the facilitation of mass death, but it serves no other authentic epistemic purpose. So I’m afraid I can’t play along, and kind of wish that no one else did, either.

From The New York Times, Sunday, October 22, 2023:

One thought on “The Epistemology of Mass Death

  1. I notice that whatever the effect of the whole thing is intended to be… shock and awe I guess… it’s not making Israel very popular, and probably increasing anti semitism more generally. Although maybe thats an observation based on the views of my left leaning friends.

    Like

Leave a comment