I have some questions about Estlund’s account of acceptability conditions on reasons (in public reasoning). Here is the first one.
(1) Acceptability conditions make sense as conditions on the reasons that it is appropriate or permitted to give to each other (aside from whether they are good or true). However, I think Estlund means for these conditions to apply to what reasons are appropriate even in private reasoning (when one is reasoning about when the state is permitted to coerce its citizens). But why would the former imply the latter? Why should standards governing giving reasons to others speak to the appropriateness of a reason (distinct from its goodness or truth) in any kind of good reasoning? This seems almost like a category mistake of some kind.
Maybe there is a kind of good reasoning that is defined or modelled on good discussion or interpersonal giving and taking of reasons? That works schematically, but would need to be fleshed out and argued for. Is this a genuine problem/lacuna in Estlund’s account or am I misunderstanding or missing something? Or maybe I’m right and I’m just missing an easy way to make the inference go through?