One problem with Estlund’s argument (Ch. 1, p. 9) is that only the denial of consent, not mere non-consent, is an event that typically changes the landscape of relevant permission/obligation. Let’s look at two cases. Suppose that the initial conditions are that we are allowed to touch each other on the shoulder in order to get the attention of person who would be touched. We now have two cases:
(Case 1) Your passive non-consent to my touching you in this way (over some period of time) leaves conditions the same: I am still allowed to touch you in this way. There is no change here to block or nullify.
(Case 2) You declare that I am no longer allowed to touch you in this way and a normative change happens (I used to be, but due to this declaration by you, I am no longer, permitted to touch you in this way). There is a change here to block or nullify.
Since mere or passive non-consent is highly relevant to non-consent-based theories of political authority, general metaphysical or metanormative points about moral powers being blocked or nullified (and treating like cases alike) do not apply to the relevant range of cases.
So I think we are left with only this point: we should not at the outset rule out the possibility that, in some conditions, non-consent (say to your doing as I say in some matter) is correlated with the same permissions/obligations as non-nullified consent (to the same thing). Maybe, in the right conditions, you are obligated to do as I say despite not consenting to it – just as in the right conditions you are permitted not to do as I say even though you agreed to. But we knew this bare possibility already. There is no additional leverage to get from general metaphysical or metaethical considerations (and from treating like cases alike).