Postscript: Addictions, Cravings, and Compulsions

Plausibly, patients having claims against agents comes to patients having standing to make claims (object, demand, complain, etc.). What does such “standing” come to, though? In order to understand this, perhaps we need to think of the relevant system of rules as being rules for a rule-governed social practice. In short, perhaps we need to think in terms of social practices, how they function, what their aims are.

We can invent social practices and we might start by looking at these sorts of social practices. It is intuitive to say that I might invent a game in which, when player A lands on spot X (in her way around the board, the object being to be the first player to complete the circuit around the board in accordance with the rules), player B, who is the player to the right of player A, has standing to demand that player A relinquish her next turn. Plausibly, B having this claim (standing to make the relevant claim) against A comes to: (i) B being permitted, according to the rules of the game, to demand that B relinquish her next turn when A lands on spot X and (ii) everyone else collectively, or whoever is the “master” of the game if the game works that way, being required to enforce B’s claim against A (in some particular way), should B make the claim. In this way, standings to make claims are features of deontic systems of rules that implicate obligations to enforce claims that are obligations possessed by whoever is that is in what I’ll call the compliance-enforcement role. In this way, claims are a function of the deontic rules of a practice that has agent, patient, and compliance-enforcement roles (in virtue of which one possesses obligations, permissions, etc.). This seems like a better hypothesis than my earlier idea that claims come to practice-relative reasons for the patient to make claims (demands, objections, etc.).

It is possible that things like demands, objections and complaints get to be claims, when they are, only by being related to such a social practice (and one with the requisite general enforcer role). It is possible, in other words, that a speech-act being a claim requires that it be part of a social practice characterized by the roles and role-associated obligations (or lack of obligation) as indicated. I have to think more about what (descriptive) claims are and how they are different from objections, complaints, demands, etc.

What Every 21st Century American Should “Know”

Posted on September 16, 2015 by Irfan Khawaja under Uncategorized

The journal Democracy is running an article revisiting E.D. Hirsch’s idea of cultural literacy, and looking for readers to help generate an updated list like the one at the end of Hirsch’s 1987 book, Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know.

Here’s the list I came up with, completely off the top of my head (i.e., involving less than a minute of thought, since that’s all the time for thought I currently have).

The list is totally idiosyncratic, and focuses on things that I either happen to be thinking about lately (1-5, 10), or that I’ve thought a lot about at one time or another but that tend not to make it onto lists of this sort (6-9). Arguably, I’ve also cheated a bit because many of my items overlap (e.g., 4-5, 6-8), and one line of the list contains two items (4). Whatever. I still think the list consists of things that every 21st century American ought (in some sense) to “know.” ~~I don’t have time to insert hot links into my list right now, but will do so when I get a chance (perhaps “IOU” should be on the list).~~

It’s an interesting question what “know” means in this context. I take “know” to mean “recognize as something important and to know something about” (to be contrasted with drawing a complete blank on encounter with the item).* It’s not entirely clear to me what epistemic value there is to knowing a lot of items in this sense; clearly, Hirsch thought that there was enough value there to serve the pedagogical goals of an ideal educational system. I read Hirsch’s book a long time ago and saw him defend its thesis in a lecture sometime in the 90s. I suppose I agree(d) in a general way that ceteris paribus, having broad cultural literacy, even in a weak sense of “knowing,” was better than not having any. But I don’t have strong views on the subject. I just think it’s fun (and easy) to generate a list, so I did.

At any rate, if there’s anything to Hirsch’s argument, I’d argue that my items belong on the list. But I’d be interested in seeing readers’ lists in the combox (obviously feel free to add to Democracy’s list as well).

*For related discussion, see Pierre LeMorvan’s “Knowledge, Ignorance, and True Belief” plus the paper by Goldman and Olsson he cites.

A Traumatic Conversation

Posted on September 12, 2015 by Irfan Khawaja under Uncategorized

Actual snippet of conversation with a nursing student in the college parking lot:

Khawaja: So have you decided on a specialization in nursing?

Student: Oh, anesthesiology, definitely. Starting salary is $160K. Cannot wait to make that much.

Khawaja: So you’re in it for the money?

Student (earnestly): No! No! I mean, right now my residency is in Trauma. Would I go into Trauma if I was just after money? I go into it because I love it. I love Trauma. Like, half the time I’m covered in blood. It’s awesome.

Khawaja: You like being covered in blood?

Student (puzzled): Well, yeah. Except maternal blood, like during a C-Section. Eww.

She’s a former student of mine. Ethics.

Lust, Shakespeare, Fantasies, and Porn

Posted on September 12, 2015 by Irfan Khawaja under Uncategorized

I thought PoT readers might be interested in a post written for my “Making Moral Decisions” blog, the site for my Phil 250 class by that name. In my never-ending quest to understand the mysteries of sex, undergraduate ethical attitudes, and the Catechism of the Catholic Church, I present “Lust, Shakespeare, Fantasies, and Porn.” The topic is the ethical status of lust as reflected in private sexual fantasy. Most of my students found my view “creepy.” I found theirs characteristically bizarre and ill-conceived. Feel free to join the ensuing dialogue of the sexually deaf, but if you do, please comment here rather than on the class site.

Postscript, September 17, 2015: The Phil 250 creepshow continued with discussion of this horror show of an article in Vanity Fair (ht: Kate Herrick). I had my students write up a response to this passage:

They [“girls”] all say they don’t want to be in relationships. “I don’t want one,” says Nick. “I don’t want to have to deal with all that—stuff.”

“You can’t be selfish in a relationship,” Brian says. “It feels good just to do what I want.”

I ask them if it ever feels like they lack a deeper connection with someone.

There’s a small silence. After a moment, John says, “I think at some points it does.”

“But that’s assuming that that’s something that I want, which I don’t,” Nick says, a trifle annoyed. “Does that mean that my life is lacking something? I’m perfectly happy. I have a good time. I go to work—I’m busy. And when I’m not, I go out with my friends.”

“Or you meet someone on Tinder,” offers John.

“Exactly,” Nick says. “Tinder is fast and easy, boom-boom-boom, swipe.”

Where’s the function argument when you need it? At some level, I just feel like slapping these kids, but that wouldn’t be very Socratic of me.

I asked my students about these guys, and an alarming proportion of them applauded Nick (didn’t just agree, but applauded). Incidentally, most of my students (more than two-thirds) are women between 18-21 years old. Here’s the overlapping consensus, put in my words:

Assume ex hypothesi that Tinder hookups of the preceding sort are consenting. If so, both parties assume all the risks of the transaction.
When women who frequent Tinder claim to be hurt (in the psychological sense) by the men on it, one of two things can be said about their situation: either (a) the mutual consent involved completely nullifies any claims about their being harmed (as in ‘volenti non fit injuria’) or (b) if the women really are harmed, then they are fully culpable for being harmed because in consenting to the interaction, they assumed the risks of being harmed. In either case, the guys are off the hook. The men are not culpable because the whole point of a hookup is to inflict the kind of harm that the women are complaining about. To complain about harm in this context is like a boxer’s complaining about being hit by a right jab in the middle of a boxing match. If ignorance is involved, it’s surely culpable ignorance.

I found this an interesting (if horrific) set of views. For one thing, it is, in form, a tacit consent argument. The claim is literally that women using Tinder are tacitly consenting to be harmed by it, and since they are, they forfeit the right to complain.

Second, I find it interesting that the argument involves the same basic presuppositions and structure as the Brennan-Magness line on adjuncts: a quick inference to the culpability of a group on the losing end of a bargain; a further inference from their culpability to their having forfeited the right to complain about ill-treatment; and a reminder that the bargain was, after all, consensual, so that the complaints amount to unseemly whining.

Third, though it’s obviously not a scientific sample (about 60 students), I found the coalitions that formed in my classes somewhat interesting. There were, broadly speaking, two of them:

Majority: the hard-hearted sexually conservative women plus the women in favor of casual sex plus virtually all of the men, endorsing (2) above.

Minority: the sexually conservative women with feminist sympathies plus the feminist liberals in favor of monogamous sex, rejecting (2) above.

Roughly speaking, the hard-hearted line was,

Tinder is something I’d never do; I have moral standards. Those who do it are sluts who deserve the harm that befalls them, if it even counts as harm at all.

The casual sex variation on this theme was:

Well, Tinder is something I’d do, but since I’d never be harmed by it, you’d never find me whining about it like the losers in the article. Hookups aren’t harmful; they’re fun. Everyone knows that Tinder is for hookups, and as long as you’re clear about that, there shouldn’t be a problem.

The men grunted their approval of this latter line. Here’s the most articulate male response I got:

Well, I mean, like…if they’re offering, what do they…and no one is forcing them…is anybody like forcing them? ….like, why are they all like complaining?…I just don’t get it.

The sexually conservative quasi-feminist women led the confused, inchoate counter-charge against their hard-hearted sisters. Mostly their view was that the men were taking unfair advantage of the women, with the liberal monogamists chiming in with an enthusiastic, “Yeah–what she said!” But this group was outnumbered by the majority group and somewhat overwhelmed by its own sense of righteous indignation.

For the most part, the men sat glowering in the back of the room, wondering when the girls (and the professor!) would shut up and class would end. I mean, what does any of this have to do with anything in the real world? Boom-boom-boom swipe.

Rethinking Rights (2): on the Hohfeldian formal characterization of rights

Posted on September 9, 2015 by Michael Young under Uncategorized

Irfan has been threatening a series of posts on rights (“Rethinking Rights” was the title for the series, I believe) for awhile now. I thought I’d start things out on that topic by saying a few things about the standard Hohfeldian formal characterization of rights. This is pretty much the place to start in thinking seriously about what rights are and what rights we have.

According to Leif Wenar’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) entry on rights, here are the four more basic elements that compose rights on the Hohfeldian characterization (the “Hohfeldian incidents”):

A has a PRIVILEGE to φ if and only if A has no duty not to φ
A has a CLAIM that B φ if and only if B has a duty to A to φ
A has a POWER if and only if A has the ability within a set of rules to alter her own or another’s Hohfeldian incidents
B has an IMMUNITY if and only if A lacks the ability within a set of rules to alter B‘s Hohfeldian incidents

For example, my legal property right in the computer that I am typing on right now consists, in part, in my having the legal privilege to use and dispose of it “as I see fit” (but in the ways that do not violate any of my legal obligations), a legal claim against others that they not similarly use and dispose of the computer and a legal power to waive this claim against particular people (as when I give you permission to use the computer to check your email).

Here are some thoughts about this account (or that were prompted by revisiting it).

(1) Features of sets of interpersonal obligations. Privileges, claims, powers, and immunities are specified or characterized in terms of patterns of duties or (deontic) rules across members of a group or population of agents. Importantly, the relevant obligations, or at least the most central ones that give rise to normative claims, are distinctively interpersonal. They have the general form of X is obligated to Y to perform PHI (and the corresponding Y has a claim against X that X perform PHI). Their form is not simply X is obligated to perform PHI. (Wenar’s formulation of privileges allows for some of the obligations in the relevant set of obligations to be purely personal or monadic (as normative epistemic requirements, like the requirement not to believe that p against the evidence, are). For simplicity, I’ll speak as if the set of obligations are interpersonal obligations.) Even though the characterizations of privileges, claims, powers, and immunities are biconditionals and are not necessarily meant to indicate corresponding constitutive accounts, the most plausible sort of view is that these elements, and hence rights, are something close to this: features of systems of interpersonal obligations. (Questions for later: Which kinds of sets of obligations yield rights – does any old set do? Which sets of obligations yield the sorts of freedom-protecting, dignity-protecting rights that have been championed since the Enlightenment?)

(2) What are interpersonal obligations? Unlike monadic requirements, interpersonal obligations are not plausibly analyzed solely in terms of the reasons (or some subset of the reasons) of the person who is obligated (the obligatee). (The epistemic requirement not to believe that p against the evidence plausibly comes to something like one having conclusive reason, relative to one’s epistemic reasons, not to believe that p against the evidence.) The property here clearly involves a relation of some sort to the obligator. My hypothesis is this: interpersonal obligations concern (i) the conclusive reasons of the obligatee (to comply with a rule that concerns how the obligator is to be treated) but also (ii) the strong reasons of the obligatee (to make claims – object, demand, complain – with respect to obligatee compliance, in the relevant sorts of circumstances, like when obligatee compliance is in question). Roughly, interpersonal obligations are the first thing in relation to the second, while correlative claims are the second thing in relation to the first. Unfortunately, I don’t have anything like a full analysis or account, but that is the direction that I would go in.

(3) Action-coordinating social practices, rules, obligations and some remarks about the order of explanation. In his formulation of powers and immunities, Wenar switches from speaking of duties to speaking of rules. Likewise, above, I speak of reasons to comply with rules. Whereas duties or obligations are inherently normative in the action-guiding sense (unless we put ‘putative’ or ‘conditional’ out front), rules are not. This is important because we do things like characterize the obligations and rights of a proposed or actual legal system without assuming that anyone has any reason at all to do as the system would require or obligate. We might think of the relevant (not action-guidingly normative) rules as specifying how agents, or agents in roles in a social practice, need to behave if the social practice is to go as it is supposed to (or function well). If an agent has the relevant sort of normative stake in the social practice, then she has reasons, relative to her role in the practice, to do things like comply with its rules. This plausible picture suggests that the nature of relevant social practices, how they go when they go well, and the conditions that make participation in them valuable to agents are explanatorily prior to action-guidingly normative interpersonal obligations (and reasons to make claims).

(4) Legal obligations: the promise of a familiar path to explanation. We might think of legal obligations as obligations that govern a social system that enforces its requirements via the coercive power of the state. Since legal rules are more or less designed by us, publicly codified and at least mostly valuable in an instrumental way, it is plausible that the conditions for having legal obligations (to do as the law requires) are broadly similar to the conditions for obeying the rules of chess when you are playing: you are participating in the practice and you have sufficient reason to continue to do so. Also, specifying what legal systems are, what they do for us, and how – necessary to fill in the substance of an appropriate system of government and law for a social circumstance – does not seem like a daunting empirical task.

(5) Moral obligations: from a certain sort of basic, general non-instrumental reason to specific, actionable obligations. Explaining what things have to be like, normatively and social-practice-wise, for there to be moral obligations (and hence rights) – and saying what they are specifically and substantively – is harder because the all-purpose social practice of relating to others in the moral manner is not designed by us (at least not much), not something we can get a grip on by reference to specific, codified public rules, and is not something that is valuable to us mostly in an instrumental way. It is also hard to get a perspective on moral practice because we cannot help but participate in a version of it (however badly). Specifically, it is hard to step outside of it and contrast it with other ways in which we might relate to others. (Only the most extreme sociopath genuinely treats others like trees or rocks. Most violent criminals justify their actions in some broadly moral way, as when a murder is justified by having been “disrespected” or “dishonored” by the murdered person in some putatively important way.) How, then, to start outlining what the moral way of relating to others is, what it is for it to function well, and why this matters to us in such a way that we have conclusive reason to follow moral norms?

We might begin by proposing a list of elements in our set of basic, non-instrumental reasons and motivations that would count as moral. If accurate and complete enough, such a list would tell us something about the elements of moral practice, how they work together, and what work they might do for us, thus shedding light on our instrumental reasons to be engaged in moral practice. (However, having relevant psychological, sociological, anthropological results that pass scientific muster would be perhaps even more helpful in figuring out what moral practice is, how it functions and toward what ends, etc.) Such a list would of course tell us something about the basic substance of morality as well. Most importantly for my purposes here, though, such a list can throw some light on the relationship between (a) certain of our basic non-instrumental reasons that count as moral and (b) more specific, actionable moral obligations that are tailored to circumstances (and to competing non-moral and moral reasons).

Here is my rough-and-ready (and no doubt somewhat inaccurate and incomplete) list:

(i) strong reason to refrain from needlessly harming others,

(ii) strong reason to object (demand, complain) in relevant circumstances in relation to being needlessly harmed by others,

(iii) reason to feel guilty or ashamed and make amends or do better next time when such objections are (correctly) lodged against one,

(iv) reason to be angry (and to punish the wrongdoers) when others needlessly harm each other, and

(v) reason to care about and promote the welfare of others and general social conditions of stability, peace, trust.

(I have a broadly Humean view of basic non-instrumental reasons in mind, but I have framed things here in a neutral way.)

And here, finally, is the result that interests me: if the ‘needlessly’ of [i] references all of one’s reasons, then basic and general moral reasons like this are indefinite and hence do not constitute actionable obligations. In order to figure out what our specific, actionable moral obligations are, we would need to take into account our other reasons (including both personal and telic-moral reasons that may be in tension with them). Additionally, we would probably also need to distinguish between different ways of potentially harming others and formulate actionable obligations at this level of specificity. For example, plausibly, we are morally obligated not to interfere with others enjoying the exclusive possession, use and disposal of material (and other) things needlessly. For doing so is harming them and we have non-instrumental reason not to harm others needlessly. But this is a far cry from specifying what our moral (or appropriate legal) right to the exclusive possession, use and disposal of property consist in, in the context of modern society (or for that matter in the context of several-dozen-large bands of hunter-gatherer humans 10,000 years ago). What specific instantiation of a general sort of obligation like this is warranted in such a case may be largely a function of: (i) the sorts of impacts on the rule-followers that is appropriately morally or legally tolerated in a modern society like our own and (ii) the likely impact on the telic moral ends of people tending to follow the specific instantiation of the general obligation or rule. Combined with the Hohfeldian framework, this is, I hope, a promising “starter template” for getting an accurate bead on what moral rights (and morally appropriate legal rights) are and how to specify which ones we have.

*****

I have quite a bit more to say (some but not all of it quite so meta-ethics-y), but for now I’ll leave it at these five points.

Ten (or So) Lessons of 9/11

Posted on September 9, 2015 by Irfan Khawaja under Uncategorized

I posted this a year ago as “Ten Lessons of 9/11.” I’m reposting it, essentially verbatim, with a new mini-lesson tacked onto (2).

We’re just a few days away from the fourteenth anniversary of 9/11. Here are a few of the lessons I’ve learned from the last decade and a half of perpetual warfare. I offer them somewhat dogmatically, as a mere laundry list (mostly) minus examples to illustrate what I’m saying. But I have a feeling that the lessons will ring true enough for many people, and that most readers can supply appropriate examples of their own.

(1) The inevitable gap between normative theorizing and political practice
A war can be justified in principle as a proportionate response to unprovoked aggression, have a rational object, have clear and publicly stated conditions for victory, and still not be worth fighting because there is no guarantee that the war will be fought on the grounds that were publicly given for fighting it. Even if a war seems perfectly justified on every conceivable matter of principle, remember that wars are fought in the real world, not ex hypothesi in thought-experiments, and that every theoretical simplification you make in thinking about a war will be more than matched by some unforeseeable complication that arises in the fog of war. Those complications may well be significant enough to nullify everything else you managed to think of, and destroy the best theoretical case for “going.”

(2) The perpetual opacity of post bellum considerations
It’s always easier to grasp the immediate and supposedly urgent reasons for going to war than to conceive, in detail, of the post bellum conditions that the war is supposed to bring about–much less to predict those conditions. But in confronting any suggestion that “we need to go to war,” try to imagine and predict how things will go in the end game, starting with the best-case scenarios and moving to the worst. I predict that you’ll find it hard even to imagine how to bring about the best-case scenarios (at least in any fine-grained way). The harder you find this, the better the case for not going.

(2a) One notable but easily-overlooked post bellum consideration: refugees. If you decide to fight a war, expect a refugee crisis, and figure out what you intend to do about it ahead of time.

(3) The crudeness of just war theory
The conceptual apparatus that philosophers bring to bear on the conduct of war consists of a set of extremely crude tools for dealing with the actual conduct of warfare. This being so, we face the following dilemma: either we should go to war in the knowledge that our best tools for dealing with it are so pathetically crude, or we should, if possible, avoid going to war in the knowledge that our best tools for dealing with it are that crude. I think it’s obvious that the latter fork provides the better way out of the dilemma.

Some examples of the conceptual crudity of some commonly-invoked ‘principles’:

The so-called non-initiation of force principle merely tells us that for any x, if x is an instance of force, x ought not to be initiated. It doesn’t give us any indication of the permissible range of values for x, and doesn’t tell us what to do if we face an instance of initiated force.
The so-called ‘last resort’ principle is, on its own, merely a directive to appeal to war (or ‘force’) as a last resort; it gives no criterion of ‘lastness’ in resorts, and gives no criterion to determine what counts as a ‘use of force’ (often conflating ‘force’ with ‘warfare’ in confusing ways).
The so-called principle of proportionality appeals to a quasi-mathematical metaphor that is in practice very hard to make literal or apply in any determinate way.
The so-called principle of discrimination tells us to target combatants but not non-combatants; it doesn’t define ‘combatant’ or ‘non-combatant,” much less apply that distinction to hard cases, or tell us what to do when non-combatants are innocent shields of combatants. Nor does it deal with the obvious but little discussed fact that ex post facto reports of ‘civilian’ fatalities in battlefield conditions are extremely imprecise, and more easily fabricated than reported with accuracy.

(4) The inevitable unreliability of allies, both moral and strategic
Either you go to war alone or you go with a coalition. If you go alone, you fight the war isolated from the rest of the world, so that your adversary can count on active or passive allies throughout the world. If you go with a coalition, the problem becomes that you can’t control what your coalition partners do, no matter how insane or immoral they turn out to be. To this day, it’s unclear whether we should have allied as closely as we did with the Soviet Union during World War II; it’s also unclear whether we should have allied so closely with right-wing dictatorships during the Cold War to fight the Soviet Union, Communist China, and their proxies. The same unclarity extends to the alliances we’ve more recently formed to fight Islamist terrorism.

(5) The inadvisability of ‘reconstructing’ another country, whether for your good, theirs, or both
A country that still suffers race riots over its own legacy of slavery and racial discrimination probably can’t be relied on to reconstruct other countries that suffer from their problematic historical legacies—especially when those engaged in reconstruction are hated as imperialist interlopers, don’t know the history of the countries they’re reconstructing, lack the resources to engage in reconstruction, are confined for security reasons to well-fortified barracks, don’t speak the native language, and are politically hostage to a public back home that is totally uninterested in what they’re doing. It tends not to help that the problematic legacies of countries that are candidates for ‘reconstruction’ arise in large part from ill-conceived prior attempts at reconstruction produced by centuries of imperialism.

(6) Truth as the first casualty of war
Truth really is the first casualty of war, in large ways as well as small. Once war begins, wait for the lies and half-truths to proliferate—from all sides, about all things. And don’t assume that you’ll have the luxury of sifting truth from falsehood during wartime, either. The informational imperatives of wartime are simplicity, digestibility, and coherence with one’s own war effort. If reality doesn’t fit that template, reality will be sacrificed to wartime imperatives, and it will be decades (if that) before anything like a more rational or objective equilibrium is restored. (If you’re interested in ‘getting involved’ in the efforts behind a genuinely justified war, ditch the idea of a military draft or compulsory national service and try an anti-rumor campaign: induce people to stop believing rumors, to stop spreading them, and to criticize any rumors that come their way. You’d be amazed how much harm is done by rumors, and how hard it is to counteract them.)

Incidentally, one casualty of war on the side of those who don’t want war is truth about the nature of foreign aggression. Dogmatic pacifists have a problematic tendency to pretend that foreign aggressors either don’t exist, or are not really aggressing because they’re responding to legitimate grievances. That attitude is too obviously false to be usefully employed in any successful anti-war effort. So don’t.

(7) Domestic liberty as the next casualty of war
The next casualty of war is domestic liberty, along with the ever-present temptation to declare ongoing states of ‘emergency’ demanding ‘emergency measures’—in part by expanding the scope of the concept of ‘emergency’ to cover anything and everything, at whim. Try coming up with a serviceable definition of “emergency,” and try to stick with it.

(8) Civil defense as an alternative to war
If you really want to avoid being attacked by foreign aggressors, seriously consider the possibility of coming up with a civil defense policy that (a) blunts the force of any aggression, (b) costs fewer lives than a war would, (c) gets the whole population involved in the “war” effort, but (d) doesn’t sacrifice domestic liberty in the process. A tall but not necessarily impossible order–no more impossible than the proverbial war that leads smoothly to victory. Your civil defense policy will inevitably have to apply at the borders of your country and be integrated with your border/immigration policy. If you confront dogmatists who insist on ‘open borders,’ ask them whether open borders as they conceive of them require a nation to allow foreign aggressors into the country without challenge. Then ask them how respect for rights would be served by such a policy.

(9) Speak up, speak out
If you oppose the idea of going to war on a given occasion, say so–a lot, to everyone, including your political representatives. People may well regard you as a monomaniac, but in this case, that’s a good thing. Better a monomaniac than a cipher.

A proviso: if you’re going to speak out against war, try not to trespass, vandalize, assault people, or blow things up in the process. It makes you look stupid and hypocritical, and it won’t stop the war.

(10) Patriotism
If you regrettably find yourself in a war, don’t bother to show your patriotic spirit by flying a flag or putting some bellicose bumper sticker on your car. Find a support organization for injured or debilitated veterans, and support it—financially or otherwise. Nothing clarifies the nature of warfare more powerfully than time spent with combat veterans. And nothing makes it clearer that even the ‘best’ wars are an enormous waste of lives, limbs, blood, effort, time, materiel, and money. If saying that doesn’t count as ‘patriotism’ where you live, say it anyway. Or find somewhere else to live.

A bonus meta-lesson: It’s perfectly OK to come up with outright excuses for not going to war, as long as the excuses don’t obscure the need to go to war in the rare case when war is justified.

New Blogger: Hendrik Van den Berg

Posted on September 8, 2015 by Irfan Khawaja under Uncategorized

I’m pleased to announce that Hendrik Van den Berg has agreed to blog for Policy of Truth. Hendrik is an Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Nebraska at Lincoln. He’s currently a Lecturer in Economics in the Department of Economics at Mt. Holyoke College in South Hadley, Massachusetts. He also happens to be on the Editorial Board of Reason Papers.

PoT is a little philosophy-heavy, so I thought it’d be nice to bring someone on board from another discipline, but Hendrik’s approach to economics is normative enough in focus to make a nice fit with PoT’s focus on political philosophy. Here’s the biographical blurb from the Mt. Holyoke site:

Professor Van den Berg teaches economic growth and development as well as international economics. He received B.A. and M.A. degrees in economics from the State University of New York at Albany and his M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in economics from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Prior to obtaining his doctorate degree, Van den berg served as a Foreign Service Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Managua, Nicaragua in the position of Commercial Officer, and at the U.S. Trade Center in São Paulo, Brazil, as Market Research and Promotion Officer. Hendrik has published many articles and is currently examining the biases of neoclassical economics and the influence of the neoclassical paradigm on the fields of international economics and economic development.

Here’s his CV.

He also backs Bernie Sanders’s proposal for a $15 minimum wage by the year 2020.

What’s up with this blog, anyway? First we’re worried about fish. Then we’re worried about adjuncts. Derrick’s carrying on about empathy and refugees and what not. We already had a Marxist, and our resident classicist turns out to be a vegetarian opponent of strip clubs. Just when you thought we were going respectable–with Potts–we manage to haul a left-wing economist into our midst. Are things ever normal here? I mean, seriously, what next?

Europe’s Refugee Problem

Posted on September 8, 2015 by Derrick Abdul-Hakim under Uncategorized

I’m curious to hear what PoT-heads and fellow travellers think of the refugee crisis brewing in Europe. It’s the talk of almost all the newspapers, magazines, and news networks here in the United Kingdom. Is it the same in the U.S.? What are the legal/moral arguments for/against the U.S. to take in these war-torn refugees? I’m slowly gaining consciousness from my summer hibernation, so I don’t have a robust opinion on the matter at the moment.

	Roderick T. Long on The Time to Bail Out Is N…
	Irfan Khawaja on Dire Strait
	Little Munic(ipality… on Eminent Domain and the Resort…
	Little Munic(ipality… on No, Eminent Domain is Not…
	Roderick T. Long on Dire Strait
	No Kings and the Ant… on Stop the War
	No Kings and the Ant… on Expel ROTC Now

Policy of Truth

The website and group blog of Irfan Khawaja

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