1.1(3) (part 1, para. 1, line 3 of Derek Bowman’s “The Circumstances of Justice” 

We owe (or are due) things from each other and there are general principles (of justice) that specify just what it is that we owe to each other.  That the verb here is ‘specify’ suggests a normative, explanatory role:  the general principles explain why each of us owes it to each other to refrain from PHI-ing, but not to refrain from PSI-ing (or perhaps why each of us owes it to each other to refrain from PHI-ing in certain circumstances but not others).  However, one of several to-me controversial things that Rawls’ characterization of justice suggests is that these general principles do not do this work, but rather some slightly different work – the work of justifying the adoption (perhaps the public adoption) of a prescriptive norm (or a nested set of prescriptive norms with a certain structure).  That might go something like this:  each of us is to refrain from PHI-ing with respect to each other person (and all of us is to stand ready to enforce the prescription to refrain from PHI-ing by demanding that potential rule-breakers don’t break the rule and by punishing actual rule-breakers).  On this second way in which the general principles might work, they do something like specify conclusive reasons to construct a particular social practice.   Continue reading →

We speak as if people have (normative) claims against social institutions.  For example, perhaps I have a claim against U.S. society that it provide sufficient opportunity – access to relevant material and social resources – for me to advance my (reasonable) interests and welfare.  On the other side of the coin, society would owe me this.

What are individual claims against social institutions (or social institutions owing one something or being obligated to do or provide something)?  This, it seems to me, is a good place to start the most general kind inquiry into what social – or more broadly institutional – justice is. Continue reading →

So, yeah, I’m finally reading this book.  Liking it quite a bit so far.  And the kind of descriptive social and psychological work explained in this book is pretty relevant to developing a broadly Humean (desire-based and functionalist) metaphysics and epistemology of moral reasons (and normative reasons generally).  It occurs to me that reading (or re-reading) Haidt might fit in with the research agendas of either or both of the two Davids.  So, would either of you, or anyone else here, be interested in reading through the book together, emailing about it a bit in a somewhat-organized way, and then maybe posting something here (or perhaps just doing the whole thing here on the blog, in a slightly more-organized and accessible-to-all kind of way)?

SUMMARY & DISCUSSION, IPOD CH.8 (8.1-8.6) Continue reading →

IPOD SUMMARY/COMMENTARY 7.4-7.7

Here goes…

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SUMMARY/COMMENTS on IPOD 7.1-7.3 [This is a continuation of a series on Arpaly-Schroeder’s In Praise of Desire (IPOD)]

Here we go…

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Irfan and I have had a bit of a reading project going.  We have been reading through Nomy Arpaly and Tim Schroeder’s IN PRAISE OF DESIRE (affectionately, “IPOD”).  I’m going to post some chapter or section summary/commentary here that is meant to more or less stand on its own (this helps me condense the material into clear essentials).  It is also meant as an invitation to read the book, or sections of it, and “get into the weeds” with us.  So here is (selective) summary/commentary for the IPOD Introduction (which, unlike many introductions, is substantive).

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