Philip Pettit’s Republicanism: A Series (5/6)

4200 words, 25 minutes’ reading time

For part 1, go here. For part 2, go here. For part 3, go here. For part 4, go here.

5. Pettit on employment-at-will
I said above that I agree in a broad way with Pettit’s critique of employment-at will. Let me put it this way: I agree that employment-at-will, at least as currently practiced in the American labor market, is a highly problematic institution, one that frequently exemplifies domination for just the reasons Pettit gives. But while this may sound like substantial-enough agreement, I think it conceals some subtle but significant disagreement. In this post, I want to work through some of the agreement and the disagreement.

Though Pettit doesn’t put things quite this way, I think we can probably agree that two things make employment-at-will problematic. One is its asymmetric character. The other are the stakes involved when it’s invoked and exercised. Continue reading →

Defiance and Compliance in Princeton (2)

Back on September 3, I posted a letter here that I’d sent to Town Topics, a local paper in my hometown of Princeton, New Jersey, asking why the paper hadn’t covered the legal proceedings against the activists who’d been arrested this past April at a Gaza Solidarity event at Princeton University. A staff writer from the paper responded, promising coverage in the future. In the three weeks since then, three issues of Town Topics have come out–September 4th, 11th, and 18th. How well has it delivered? Continue reading →

Philip Pettit’s Republicanism: A Series (4/6)

2800 words, 15 minutes’ reading time.
For part 1 of this series, go here. For part 2, go here. For part 3, go here.

4. Pettit on domination
I started out by saying that I have a conflicted–with any luck, instructively conflicted–view of Pettit’s republicanism, and of its application to employment-at-will. I wish I had a single snappy way of describing my conflict, but I don’t. At one level, I agree in principle with Pettit; at another level, I don’t. At one level, I agree with Pettit’s critique of employment-at-will; at another level, I don’t. Let me work through some of this out loud in the hopes that my tangles are instructive to others. Continue reading →

Save Your Outrage

About a month ago, a woman having a mental health episode was shot dead by the police in the city of Fort Lee, New Jersey. About a week ago, schools in South Jersey were closed after shooting threats there. Before that, a shooting at a New Jersey football game caused a stir. Then a dirt bike theft and shooting incident in Dennis, New Jersey caused school cancellations. Two days ago, a burglary suspect was non-fatally shot by the police in Rumson, New Jersey. Around the same time, perhaps for comic relief, a New Jersey police officer shot himself in the leg during a drill at a shooting range in Passaic County. Back on August 9, a Jersey City activist was shot in the leg by the Israel Defense Forces in Beita, in the West Bank. To cap it off, almost exactly a month later, another American activist was shot dead by the same Israel Defense Forces in the same place. She was buried yesterday. Continue reading →

Philip Pettit’s Republicanism: A Series (3/6)

For part 1 of this series, go here. For part 2 of this series, go here.

5300 words, 28 minutes’ reading time
Trigger warnings: broken promises, failed hookups, orgasm gaps, Immanuel Kant, Murray Rothbard, Richard Epstein, employment

3. Contract and liberal interference
Traditionally, liberals have insisted that property and contractual rights—including those rights exercised within a corporate setting–are expressions of freedom, and so, fall within the zone or space to be protected by the State. Buying, selling, paying, loaning, renting, hiring, firing, investing, gifting, donating and so on are all protected on the side of what we might call the economic agent, as are being bought-from, being sold-to, being paid, being loaned-to, being rented-to, being hired, being fired, having someone invest your money, and so on, on the side of what we might call the economic patient. A third party “interferes” here when agent and patient consent to engage in one of the preceding activities, but the third party steps in to intrude on (hence violate) the agreed-upon terms, putting an impediment in the way of one of the party’s satisfaction of the terms. Continue reading →

Dreaming 9/11

From a journal entry I wrote on the morning of September 10, 2021:

I just woke up from a dream in which I went to the Taliban’s Afghanistan to “see what would happen.” Ten minutes into the dream, I get apprehended and set up for interrogation and torture. Predominant feeling is disappointment at how dumb, sadistic, and unreligious my captor is, as though I was expecting a Taliban interrogation to be an academic seminar on the pros and cons of theocracy led by a latter-day Abul Ala’ Mawdudi rather than a torture session led by a bunch of illiterate psychopaths. (As it happens, Mawdudi was my father’s Arabic teacher in real life. Was Freud right? Are all dreams about wish fulfillment?)

Continue reading →

Philip Pettit’s Republicanism: A Series (2/6)

For part 1 of this series, go here.

2. Republicanism and/vs. liberalism
Central to Pettit’s book is a contrast between republicanism and liberalism. The contrast is useful, but complicated by several terminological complexities. In colloquial American parlance, we often contrast the ideology of the Republican Party with that of liberalism, itself associated with the Democratic Party. So it may tempting at first to think that Pettit is defending the former against the latter. In fact, the preceding contrast has almost nothing to do with the way the terminology of “republicanism” and “liberalism” is used in political philosophy, and nothing to do with the topic of Pettit’s book. So set it aside. Continue reading →

Philip Pettit’s Republicanism: A Series (1/6)

  1. Introduction

We’ve been discussing Philip Pettit’s Republicanism in our online discussion group since March of this year. Our July 21 meeting focused on Chapter 5, “Republican Aims and Policies”: “what a state ought to achieve, and what form it ought to assume, in the modern world” (Republicanism, p. 129). Chapter 5 is the first of four in the book that explicitly ties the book’s theoretical claims to political practice, concretizing what would otherwise be a rather abstract set of theses.

I’ve had some conflicted thoughts about Pettit’s republicanism from the beginning of our discussions, crystallized by his account in Chapter 5 of a pet topic of mine, at-will employment. Having recently finished the book, I sat down over the last few weekends to put my thoughts in order. I have no idea whether these thoughts are of general interest, but in any case, I’ve written up a series of five longish blog posts on Republicanism (five excluding this one), and sketched out a bunch of shorter digressions that were originally footnotes but ended up taking on a life of their own. Starting tomorrow, I’ll post the first of the five posts here, followed by one post per week. I haven’t yet written up the digressions, so there’s no telling when (or if) they’ll appear. But they’re digressions, after all. They can wait. So can you. Continue reading →

Hell Is Empty and All the Administrators Are Here

Cass Sunstein has a Guest Essay in today’s New York Times that argues that the First Amendment is the key to the norms that govern free speech on campus: “Only the First Amendment Can Protect Students, Campuses, and Speech.” His point is that universities should either adhere to First Amendment jurisprudence or legislate and enforce some functional equivalent of it. The First Amendment is (on this reading) supposed to be a content-neutral protector of free speech, with exceptions that Sunstein duly enumerates in the latter half of the essay.

Some of what he says seems fine, and some of it seems wrongheaded, but I was struck by the insouciant sloppiness of this particular sentence: 

In a class on Shakespeare, students and professors can be instructed by administrators to discuss Shakespeare, not the presidential election.

No, they can’t. That’s not how academic freedom works, not how Shakespeare works, and not how pedagogy works. Continue reading →