In two previous posts (here and here), I’ve made reference to the report by police tactical expert Philip Hayden as the best written account of the events relevant to Scot Peterson’s actions at the Parkland Shooting. In the just previous-post, I raised some provisos and reservations about Hayden’s report, but (apart from Appendix A) those are all matters of omission and incompleteness, not of disagreement with anything Hayden says in the report. In fact, I fully agree with the contents of the report. I received the report in the form of two PDFs. Here is the first one, which I’ve called “Hayden 1,” about 53 pages long, and here is the second, which I’ve called “Hayden 2,” about 17 pages long.*

I highly suggest that anyone interested in this topic read the whole report in its entirety, from beginning to end. It’s somewhat long, about 41 single-spaced pages of text, and another five pages of appendices. But every sentence is worth reading.

Having taught university students for twenty-six years, I know that very few people will “do the reading.” In what follows, I’ve excerpted about 3,000 words from the report highlighting its main findings. I emphasize that a set of excerpts is not a substitute for reading the whole report. I offer these excerpts below with only minimal comment, on the premise that a set of excerpts is better than nothing.

Hayden’s summary judgment (p. 4):

It is my opinion that Deputy Peterson used good judgement and followed the policies and procedures as mandated by the Broward County Sheriff’s Office (BSO) when he did not enter Building 12 of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School on February 14, 2018. I do not believe that any properly trained law enforcement officer would have reason to believe that Deputy Peterson shirked his responsibilities or acted in a cowardly way by not entering Building 12 to confront the shooter. While all the officers who responded to this school shooting believed they personally performed their duties in a way that they believed were appropriate, it should be noted that none of the officers who arrived at the school while the shooting was occurring ever attempted to make entry into Building 12. They all waited for additional officers to arrive and then formed teams and made a tactical entry into the building. They then cleared the building using good tactical movements. It should be noted that the shooter (Cruz) had left the building eight minutes and 36 seconds before the first tactical team entered the building.

Hayden’s summary account of the  basic evidential complication confronting anyone passing judgment on Peterson (p. 5):

The problem that existed during this entire event was knowing where the perpetrator, Nikolas Cruz, was at any given time. By the time any officer could have made entry into Building 12, Cruz was within seconds of entering the stairwell on the first floor and was approximately 200 feet from where any officer would have entered. To make the situation even more difficult, there was a great deal of debris falling from the ceiling on the first floor. This debris made it problematical to see from the east stairwell, where the police officer could have entered, to the west stairwell where Cruz was. It would have been almost impossible for any officer to see down the hallway under those conditions, identify a shooter from a student, take an accurate shot from great distance, only strike the shooter with no injuries to those around him, and do it all in less than a couple of seconds.

Hayden’s description of just a few of the security lapses that allowed Cruz to make his way onto campus and into the 1200 Building (p. 8):

Unlocked and opened gates were regularly left unstaffed for long periods of time on the MSD campus. School administrators cited a lack of personnel as the explanation for the unstaffed and open gates. The first-floor doors on the east and west sides of Building 12 remained unlocked throughout the day and were unlocked at the time of the shooting. The amount of foot traffic utilizing that building throughout the day was cited as to why the doors were not kept locked. Individual classroom door locks could only be locked from outside the door, so the teachers would have to exit their classrooms and use a key to lock the doors. There was no way to lock the door from within the classroom. A quarter turn of the key would allow the door to be opened but still remain locked after closing the door.

Hayden’s account of the communications problems encountered on the day of the shooting (p. 9):

According to Sergeant Molamphy, poor radio communication issues were well known, and he had no way to communicate even when he was in his office on a normal day. “There is no incoming or outgoing communications. So, nothing has changed. But, yet, that was known from the top down… But, before the shooting, it was like, you know, Parkland, you cannot communicate. You are lucky if you can communicate at all, and that’s just on a regular day. There are just days that you will be in the field and you catch only part of what dispatch says. The static is incredible. So, communications are still horrible up there.”

More communication/intelligence problems, and Peterson’s essential role in dealing with and rectifying them on the day of the shooting (p. 10):

The school video cameras were on a 20-minute delay, but the report being sent out was understood to be in real-time, which meant that unbeknownst to all, bad information was being sent to Deputy Peterson and others as to Cruz’s position and what was happening inside the building. Deputy Peterson maintained a visual on the building entrances/exits and did not run away or hide but instead, remained in location where he steadfastly provided valuable intelligence and maintained ongoing radio communication. He remained in a location where he believed he could see the entire building as well as entry/exit points and report back everything that he saw and heard. Deputy Peterson had 3,090 students and approximately 210 staff members to protect, and he knew, as the incident commander, he needed to lockdown the entire campus. If he had gone into Building 12 and Cruz had then left that building and headed to another area where he continued to shoot, Deputy Peterson would not have been in a position to see him leave and in all likelihood, more students would have been killed.

It is easy to speculate after the fact when looking at a situation with 20/20 vision of hindsight, but the truth is that there was no way to know at that time how many shooters there were and whether the shooter(s) would leave the building and head directly into another building. By taking a position where he believed he could see any exit/entry of Building 12, Deputy Peterson believed he could provide additional information and would be able to confront and stop the shooter(s) from exiting Building 12 and continuing through the campus. It is my opinion that if Deputy Peterson had gone into Building 12 at any time after the one minute and 48 second period, he would not have been able to locate Cruz or stop the threat and ultimately impact the tragic outcome of this catastrophic disaster. It is also my opinion that even a highly trained tactical officer with prodigious tactical skills would not have been able to enter Building 12 and locate and stop Cruz before he had completed his killing spree.

Initial observations of Cruz’s movements, and initial reports of shots fired (pp. 11-12):

Medina first saw Cruz walking from the Uber toward Building 12 at 2:19:53 with a duffel bag. Cruz began shooting in Building 12 one minute and 45 seconds later. When there were the first reports of shots being fired, no one was sure where they were coming from, and no one had yet been able to confirm whether they were shots or firecrackers. Deputy Peterson arrived at the east end of Building 12 at 2:23:19 to assess the situation. He arrived with School Security Officer Greenleaf one minute and 41 seconds after Cruz began his shooting spree. This was one minute and 48 seconds after Cruz began shooting and Cruz was now in the stairway of the west end of Building 12. At 2:23:19, Deputy Peterson walked towards the east entrance of Building 12 and “stopped in his tracks” when he heard two to three gunshots which he believed to be outside. Deputy Peterson immediately communicated that to BSO dispatch per BSO’s Active Shooter protocol and called a Code Red over the school radio. Ms. Anna Ramos heard Deputy Peterson call a Code Red over the school radio at 2:23:26 and then she heard someone state that it sounded like firecrackers. Assessing the gunfire was outside, Deputy Peterson ordered Greenleaf to leave the area and Deputy Peterson looked for the closest tactical position of cover to assess where the gunfire was emanating from. Deputy Peterson knew that you always need to be cognizant of the fact that there may be more than one shooter. Deputy Peterson’s assessment of the shots outside was accurate based on his radio transmission at 2:23:25 of “shots fired” one second after Aaron Feis was shot outside by Cruz.

Comment: I regard the preceding passage as absolutely crucial to Peterson’s defense, even more crucial than Hayden’s commentary suggests. The passage calls attention to the fact that Peterson was correct in believing that the gunfire he heard was outside. It was outside. More precisely and literally, it was fired from inside through an open door to the outdoors. Since the two or three shots Peterson heard were in a real sense outside, and were followed by nearly a half minute of silence, it was entirely reasonable for Peterson to have believed that it was (more than merely) possible that the gunfire and gunman were outside.** This fact is by itself sufficient to acquit Peterson of the criminal charges brought against him. He may have been mistaken in inferring that the gunman was outside or remained outside, but there is no plausible sense in which he can be held criminally liable for child neglect in making the wrong inference under these circumstances. The claim is absurd on its face, but happens to be the crux of the prosecution’s case against Peterson.

Hayden continues (pp. 11-12):

Two days after the shooting spree, Deputy Peterson testified to BSO Homicide that he was “maybe 10 feet from the building…I hear gunfire.” Det. Curcio asked, “Could you tell what floor it was coming from?” Deputy Peterson answered, “I thought it was outside. It was so loud.” Deputy Peterson testified to BSO Homicide, “I thought it was probably outside. I didn’t even think it was even inside the building because it was so clear and loud at this point. I knew it was close to this building, but I wasn’t sure if it was i n the building, was it outside the building, but I knew it was close.” Deputy Peterson’s radio transmissions are evidence of his real-time intelligence and to him not knowing where the shots were coming from. At no time during the shooting did Deputy Peterson advise BSO dispatch of an active shooter inside Building 12 nor did he have any knowledge of students and staff inside the third-floor hallway. Deputy Peterson, following BSO protocol and giving his location to dispatch, was heard saying that he heard the shots were outside. He stated, “We just hear shots, appears to be shots fired.” At 2:24:24, Deputy Peterson was heard over the radio saying, “We don’t have a description.” Deputy Peterson had no real-time intelligence, nor did he have any knowledge that there was an active shooter inside the third-floor hallway shooting students and staff. At 2:24:33, Cruz began shooting to the west on the third floor. It was at this time that teacher Scott Beigel was fatally wounded, and Joaquin Oliver, Meadow Pollack, and Anthony Borges were shot. Deputy Peterson had already ordered the Code Red, so Deputy Peterson believed that all students and staff were locked down and sheltered inside their classrooms. At 2:25:11, Deputy Kratz (Tango 2) made what seemed to be confirmational statements that the shots were indeed coming from outside when he radioed, “I hear shots fired by the football field. Shots fired by the football field.” Again at 2:27:03, Deputy Katz incorrectly broadcast that shots were fired by the football field. By this time there were 7 BSO officers in addition to Deputy Peterson within the immediate proximity of the shooting and Sergeant Miller failed to pursue the sound of gunshots and/or to direct his deputies to do so. Reports were sporadic, yet Deputy Peterson consistently tried to maintain control by putting out correct information in a timely manner. At one minute and 48 seconds after Cruz fired his first shot, Deputy Peterson radioed that the shots were coming from Building 12.

Comment: Again, the preceding underscores the fact that Peterson’s belief that the gunman was outside was not just reasonable, but was believed and acted upon by everyone around him. It makes no sense whatsoever to call witnesses to the stand, as the prosecution has done, who tell the jury that they had to ask Peterson what was happening around them, when it is the prosecution’s claim that it was self-evident from the sound of gunfire what was happening around them. If the sound of Cruz’s gunfire gave self-evident, unequivocal evidence to Peterson that the gunfire was coming from within Building 1200, it had to do so to everyone else at the scene.

It cannot make sense to assert that the sound of gunfire was self-evident to Peterson, and only to Peterson, but not to the 7 BSO officers in the immediate proximity of the shooting. It makes no sense to hold Peterson criminally liable for a “failure” to rush toward the sound of the gunfire (in the absence of any precise knowledge of the source of the gunfire) but to hold no one else responsible for hearing exactly the same thing and “failing” to do the same thing. (Nor does it make sense in this context to laud the heroics of officers who went in when there was no gunman shooting, hence no shooting to be heard.) It makes no sense for officers functioning as witnesses for the prosecution to assert that they had to ask Peterson what was happening in their own immediate vicinity, and also that what was happening was self-evident (but only to Peterson). Unless these officers were hearing impaired, they heard exactly what Peterson heard. If Peterson heard distinctly, they heard distinctly. If they claim not to have heard distinctly, they cannot coherently claim that Peterson did.

If Peterson perjured himself in denying that the evidence was so obvious, how can people engaged in the same offense be called as reliable, truthful witnesses against him? A jury that fails to raise these obvious issues in its deliberations is not doing its duty, and not doing justice. But on the face of it, the implications are obvious, and redound to the discredit of the prosecution: the auditory evidence was not self-evident and not unequivocal. It was highly ambiguous. The sound of gunfire was not clearly outside the building or simply inside the building. It was both. Further, the sound of the gunfire gave no clear indication of the shooter’s location. It suggested both an indoor and an outdoor location. In general, the scientific evidence casts doubt on the idea that a moving sniper can be stalked in a semi-urban environment in the absence of any visual cues as to his location. Given all this, Peterson must be acquitted. To convict a person against such evidence is a crime of its own.

Hayden continues (pp. 16-17):

6. MAKING ENTRY INTO BUILDING 12 TO CONFRONT CRUZ, AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK

It is my opinion that there was a high likelihood that if Deputy Peterson went into Building 12 with no backup, he simply would have been another casualty. Cruz was prepared mentally and physically to kill not only students but anyone who interfered. Coach Aaron Feis, a campus monitor who thought he could assist, entered the back stairway door and was immediately killed by Cruz at one minute and 47 seconds after the first shot. This occurred before Cruz headed up to the second floor and just six seconds after Deputy Peterson arrived at the east side of Building 12. It is my opinion that making an entry by one or more officers is a commendable action and would be considered very heroic by most people, but officers would not be required to make entry even if the department or the school system they worked for said they needed to. In other words, police are well within their rights to decide when to intervene to protect the lives and property of others even when a threat is apparent. It is my opinion that police officers do heroic actions every day and that they often choose to do heroic actions, but they are not mandated to do so. It is my opinion that in this case, Deputy Peterson made a decision based on what he believed was best, upon the information he had at that time. It is my opinion that a one-person entry by someone who is not properly trained would have been an impossible mission and that Deputy Peterson making entry into Building 12 would not have accomplished the objective of saving the students inside that building.

The MSD Report also stated an opinion that “Deputy Scot Peterson was derelict in his duty on February 14, 2018, failed to act consistently with his training, and fled to a position of personal safety while Cruz shot and killed MSD students and staff. Deputy Peterson was in a position to engage Cruz and mitigate further harm to others, and he willfully decided not to do so.” There are two problems with this statement. First, Deputy Peterson did not fail to act consistently with his training because there was “no mandated training for SROs, including no requirement for training in single-officer response to an active assailant.[“] Deputy Peterson was never in a position to engage Cruz because he lacked the information as to where Cruz was specifically located at any given time. Deputy Peterson took a position near Building 12 so that he could watch for the shooter(s) exiting that building. He did not run and hide as others did but instead stayed close to Building 12 and told the campus security personnel to leave because they did not have firearms, a likely lifesaving command. It is my opinion that if Deputy Peterson was only looking out for his own safety, he would have retreated far away from Building 12. Instead, he did the right thing and stayed near the building where he thought the shooter was in order to gather and provide intelligence.

Second, Deputy Peterson did what BSO policy said he should do. His decision not to go in is a reasonable one based upon policy and procedures of the BSO. He was following regulations and did not have real-time intelligence. Deputy Peterson heard shots but was not sure where they were coming from. It would have been a foolish action for him to disregard all that information he had and make an emotional decision. It is my opinion and it is a law enforcement standard that any officer responding to a crisis should consider all real-time intelligence before making a decision. Deputy Peterson had no real-time intelligence other than hearing shots. Deputy Peterson arrived at the east end of Building 12 at 2:23:19, just seven seconds before Cruz disappeared into the west stairwell of the first floor. If Deputy Peterson had decided to make entry, he would have had only seven seconds to decide that the shooting was in Building 12, run several feet to the exterior door at the east entrance for the first floor, make entry through that door, locate Cruz, and engage him. However, there was a lot of dust falling in the first floor due to shots being fired so you could not see clearly down the hall, Cruz was moving into the west end stairway which was 184 feet away, there were multiple students near him and Deputy Peterson only had his handgun. Even an expert shooter would have a difficult time locating the shooter and accurately engaging Cruz at 184 feet. In addition, Deputy Peterson was the Incident Commander; and if he had gone in, there would have been no one for the arriving officers to communicate with.

It has never been a legal duty within law enforcement to get yourself shot or seriously injured in protecting another person. Neither the MSD Commission nor any other law enforcement organization can lawfully dictate that their officers have a duty to get killed or injured for anyone else. The closest BSO came to saying that their deputies have a duty to go in to rescue students from an active shooter is when they stated in their Policies and Procedures that a deputy “MAY” go in. It is my opinion that there is no law enforcement organization within the United States that mandates an officer shall put him or herself into a dangerous situation to save another person. It always has been a choice; and if an officer does do something heroic, they will usually receive a medal for bravery, which is an indicator that they went above and beyond the call of duty by performing as they did. Bravery has always been a choice, but it is my opinion that bravery should be done with the knowledge that you have the skills and understand what you are doing and not just running into a situation where you will be killed or seriously injured.

Hayden (pp. 18-19):

7. NOT ENOUGH TIME FOR DEPUTY PETERSON TO SEE AND ENGAGE CRUZ It is my opinion that there was not enough time for Deputy Peterson to have gone into Building 12, locate and confront Cruz, and stop the shooting. By the time Deputy Peterson arrived near Building 12 with Greenleaf and Medina, Cruz had already shot and killed 11 students and staff and wounded another 13 while on the first floor. It is my opinion that after the initial shots, and if Deputy Peterson knew where the shots were coming from, he still would not have been able to make entry and engage Cruz in order to stop him from inflicting the initial fatalities and wounding students and staff on the first floor. One minute and 41 seconds after Cruz fired the first shot, he was in the first-floor west stairwell and heading to the second floor. There was only a window of six seconds when Cruz was in the west stairway and Deputy Peterson was at the east side of the building. It is my opinion that even if Deputy Peterson had run immediately to the east entrance of Building 12 and opened the door, he would not have been able to see, identify, or engage Cruz on the first floor. It is my opinion that it would have taken Deputy Peterson more than five or six seconds to run up to the outside door for the east entrance of Building 12, open the door, and make entry. The timeline shows that as Cruz entered the stairwell, Deputy Peterson was processing a flood of information and had transmitted to the BSO reports of possible shots fired. By the time Deputy Peterson had completed his transmission, Cruz had momentarily ceased shooting and completed his carnage on the first floor and was headed to the second floor. It is my opinion that if Deputy Peterson had made entry into the east entrance to Building 12 as soon as he completed his initial radio transmission reporting the shooting, the timeline shows that Cruz would have been on his way to the second floor. The east and west stairways are 184 feet apart, and students were in the same area as Cruz, which would have made it almost impossible to see and identify Cruz and safely engage him by firing at him. The video footage of the interior of Building 12 shows that when Cruz started to shoot, the dust from the ceiling tiles started to fall making it very difficult to clearly see the distance of the hallway on the first floor.

Hayden (p. 28):

11 (d) THE BSO FAILED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY RESOURCES The BSO failed to provide Deputy Peterson with the necessary resources to fully execute his duties as a law enforcement officer. For this discussion, resources are equipment, specifically a tactical vest, police rifle, and an interoperable radio to communicate with both responding law enforcement personnel and dispatch. Another resource the BSO failed to provide was proper manning of the SRO program, especially for a public school consisting of 14 buildings and with a daily population of over 3,000 students and facility. Tactical vests, police rifles, and radios are considered standard equipment issued to law enforcement officers for which they also receive training on how to maintain and properly utilize while exercising his discretion in performing his duties as a law enforcement officer in enforcing Florida state criminal codes. Deputy Peterson did not have access to a tactical vest or police rifle. The fact that his BSO issued radio was not fully functioning also constitutes a failure of the BSO to provide a critical piece of law enforcement equipment. Not having the proper equipment would most certainly impact Deputy Peterson’s decisions and actions.

Some tactical programs suggest running toward the shots. In this situation, though, Cruz was moving and shooting intermittently, so it would have been extremely difficult or nearly impossible to pinpoint Cruz’s exact location at any given time. It is my opinion that background, experiences, and education, that one officer running into a building where shots are being fired is an unreasonable expectation and Deputy Peterson was correct in staying close to Building 12 and trying to gather information and broadcast it to the officers who were arriving. Why would Deputy Peterson be expected to run into the building alone when responding officers did not? Multiple police officers arrived, waited for backup, assessed the situation, and obtained appropriate gear before entering Building 12. They entered seven minutes and 41 seconds after the shooter had left the building. Not one of the officers who arrived at the school made the decision to immediately run into building and engage the shooter, although they arguably have a higher level of training and experience using their weapons than Deputy Peterson.

The report goes on for another 13 pages, but I think an attentive reader who’s read the excerpts so far will have gotten sufficient sense of Hayden’s argument either to grasp the point without needing to read the rest, or to have developed an appetite to read the rest. I suggest doing the latter.

*Many thanks to Kevin Bolling for sending these PDFs along.

**I corrected this sentence after posting, changing “full minute” to “half minute.” Twenty-six seconds elapsed between the shooting of Feis and the next set of shots fired, from 2:23:25 to 2:23:51. But the substantive point remains.