How to Fix the United States

How to Fix the United States: Amendments and a Constitutional Convention

At this point, it must be obvious to everyone paying attention that the United States is a nation in deep trouble. Over the last two decades, both the effectiveness and democratic credentials of the US federal government have gone into decline, which has helped to drive increasing political polarization and public frustration that steepens the decline. More of the public turn to extremist politicians promising to eviscerate their political enemies, which makes the compromises needed in the American federal system totally impossible. Even the basics cannot get done: a single senator holds up over 300 military officer promotions for many months; a group of six radical House members out of 435 cause a government shutdown by holding up funding bills. Continue reading

A Critique of Gerald Gaus’s Tyranny of the Ideal (Part 2 of 2)

Continued from part 1.

Then Gaus turns to coordination problems like Stag Hunt / Assurance game (213-15), which (he should add) also involve an independent dimensions of CAPs. It consists in an interaction-situation having more than one equilibrium, at least one of which is not P-optimal, so that arriving at the (or one of the) P-optimal equilibria requires coordination. It is crucial that in many of these cases, a mere convention like stopping at red lights rather than green lights can suffice; nothing deeper need underlie it. Sometimes the natural “salience” of certain phenomena, places, or things does underlie it (red, being associated with blood, is perhaps naturally alarming / arresting). Continue reading

A Critique of Gerald Gaus’s Tyranny of the Ideal (1 of 2)

There are a lot of good things to say about Gerald Gaus’ book, The Tyranny of the Ideal (Princeton University Press, 2016). It is a difficult work because it operates mostly at a meta-theoretical level, focusing on properties and problems of “ideal” theories of justice in general – although there is quite a bit of commentary on Sen’s theory and Rawls’s approach in Political Liberalism and after. Still, it contains may insights on these topics, and especially epistemic difficulties in discerning what ideal justice actually requires. But I will not focus on many of the good points here, simply in the interests of space. Continue reading

An Exponential Corporate Tax Based on Market Share

Apologies that my posts are much shorter than Irfan’s. But sometimes I have only the nugget of an idea that still seems worth developing enough to warrant sharing at a preliminary stage. I’ve done a lot of reflecting in recent years on the growing problems of oligopoly and monopoly in American commerce — having taught about this in an interdisciplinary course on Market Failures and Public Goods. It is not a ‘sexy’ issue that draws a lot of attention like culture wars material. And that’s a shame, because it is a far bigger part of “structural injustice” than many of the things discussed in the culture wars (imho). And, because most people finish high school without even 10 minutes on what public goods are and what kinds of problems prevent markets from working optimally, less than maybe 2% of Americans understand why big tech companies like Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook etc. now have so much power and are driving up economic inequality by buying up every competitor or driving them out of business via unfair advantages. The root cause is what’s known as a network externality in which the goods being sold are not merely non-rival, but even anti-rival: because they become a “standard,” the more people use them, the more valuable they become. They are also get a critical edge in visibility, and no competitors can get over the threshold to compete well enough with them. The result is a so-called “long tail” distribution in which one company in a sector may get 50% of the profits, the next-strongest getting 10%, the third strongest getting 3%, and so on down through thousands each getting much less than 1%.

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Germany, Ukraine, and Habermas: An American Perspective

A decade ago, on one of his visits to the United States, I urged Jürgen Habermas to support the idea of a global democratic alliance that could replace the discredited United Nations Security Council and form a sufficient counterweight to rising threats from Russia and China. This idea, which is developed in my book, A League of Democracies, is based on the hopes of many reformers in the “Atlanticist” movement before the deep compromises of the UN Charter. But it also follows from the logic of Habermas’s own work on democratic theory, together with the central findings of game theory, which imply the need for reliable solidarity and cost-sharing among able nations for paramount goals such as securing the most basic human rights from the manifold threats of absolute tyranny. Continue reading