According to my suggested analysis of O[that P] – see my immediately previous post, “Person-Directed Anger…” – it is appropriate for one to have negative, person-directed attitudes toward a person (i) failing to have positive attitudes toward that-P obtaining (or failing to have negative attitudes toward P not obtaining).

But it makes sense that, because of this, it is also appropriate for one to have negative, person-directed attitudes toward a person (ii) failing to do anything to realize or promote that-P obtaining (e.g., failing to do her part even if, in somewhat unfortunate circumstances, her part is just something like speaking out in some way, perhaps pointing out that we, all of us around here, really need to come up with a plan to collectively achieve that-P). I’m inclined to include this element in the analysis of O[that P].

Likewise, plausibly, moving just a bit rationally downstream from the (justified) person-directed attitude, one would have fitting-attitude type reason to “hold people to account” for failing to care about whether that-P obtains (e.g., express the negative person-directed attitude, in the hope of inducing guilt or other self-corrective motivation). And also (in line with [ii]) fitting-attitude-type reason to hold people to account for failing to take actions to promote that-P. This, too, I’m inclined to think, is part of the proper analysis of O[that P]. What, then, might we need to add to this to get R[that P]? (Or why – problematically – are we not already there?)

The right answer, I’m now seeing more clearly than I was in one of my comments on the referenced post, is this: one not only has fitting-attitude-type reason, but sufficient (or perhaps conclusive) reason to hold people to account for doing something (or taking these or those specific steps) to promote that-P obtaining. These reasons, when over and above those of fitting-attitude, would be broadly practical (and of the right sort – no Dr. Evil threats please). So things like that-P obtaining promoting other things that are valuable to society would be relevant. So too would be the existence of a plan to collectively achieve that-P so that everyone has a specific part to play in the collective achievement of that-P. However: perhaps, at the limit, in some cases the egregiousness of the wrongness (in failing to care about that-P obtaining or promote that-P in any way) – i.e., strong person-directed anger being fitting – would on its own make for having sufficient (conclusive) reason to hold people to account for failing to do something (or perhaps specific sorts of things) to promote that-P. In any case, the sufficient (conclusive) reason here would have to include the more-basic, fitting-attitude-based reason to hold people to account. 

That’s it. It is a separate issue how non-agential oughts and requirements relate to agential oughts and requirements (the topic, more or less, of an earlier post of mine, “When Society Ought to Be Some Way”). However, the approach argued for here suggests that non-agential requirement requires agential requirement (and also that non-agential ought requires a kind of agential ought, at least if fittingness entails a kind of ought). I think this general sort of dependency is often asserted, though perhaps not in the way or for the reasons suggested here.